Lois Nantais
Lois Nantais completed a Master of Arts in Integrated Studies at Athabasca University with an independent track in moral psychology. Nantais lives near Sarnia, Ontario, where she teaches psychology and ethics at Lambton College. She is also the coordinator for the Centre for Academic Integrity at her college. Nantais is a published poet and considers the depth of meaning found through emotion — whether assessed in philosophy or expressed in poetry — both provocative and enriching.
John Deigh’s (1992) collection of essays stands as a subtle affront to the longstanding tradition of philosophical inquiry that favours Kantian-based rationality in ethical deliberation. Through a deliberate arrangement of philosophical articles, where each essay contributes a specific value in recognizing the impact emotional life has on critical thinking, Deigh builds an encompassing validation of emotionality in deliberative inquiry. Deigh’s articles sweep from the bases of moral deliberation, including the emotional experiences of conscience, guilt and shame, through to the devastating effects in social life caused by unrestrained and antisocial emotions. For Deigh, traditional philosophical prescriptions that use cognitively-rigid rationality and neglect the emotion-based psychological resources are highly problematic. Deigh points a cautionary finger to a society that is vulnerable to social-psychological fragmentation caused from this rigidity in deliberative processing, suggesting that over-rationalization and diminishment of care and connection to others can ultimately lead to the potential for breeding psychopathic behaviour and the moral deterioration of society.
By choosing a compendium of articles, Deigh establishes a provocative thesis, asserting the significance of emotions in the deliberative processes involved with moral psychology, and in the analysis of such articles, Deigh’s book points to a need to take a deeper look at what has been absent to the philosophers and to our society as a result of devaluing and suppressing the experiential contributions made from the insights of our emotional intelligence.
Keywords: Philosophy, Kantian ethics, Moral psychology, Emotions, Logic, Ethical Deliberation
“People who lean on logic and philosophy and rational exposition end by starving the best part of the mind.” William Butler Yeats
The Irish poet Yeats articulates the concern addressed by John Deigh (1992) in his collection of philosophical essays, Ethics and Personality. Deigh’s work serves as a representational discourse in the field of contemporary ethical inquiry, highlighting a dynamic discussion that concerns the values of affectivity and intrinsic motivation in the process of moral inquiry. Deigh’s book is decidedly in favour of expanding beyond the Kantian platform of rationalization that has been commonplace in philosophy throughout the past 150 years. In his efforts, Deigh wishes to include those philosophical voices who, like Yeats’, assert the primacy of psychological features like emotions, desires and intrinsic motivations, in the formation of moral persons and an ethical society.
In addition to providing noteworthy findings unique to each article’s subject matter, Deigh’s collection of essays illustrates a flow of thought that blends the philosophical contributions made by each essay into the development of a central concern: the necessity for affectivity in people who use critical analysis. Deigh’s book, in its philosophical underpinnings, is dialectical in the priority of reason versus the power of emotions in human ethical deliberation, conveying the value of emotions in how they, when used resourcefully, create self-worth, integrity and personal identity.
Deigh’s aim is to weave together essays in ethical theory centred on descriptive psychological analyses and concerning ethical social relations together with interests in individual personality features. By taking such diversity in hand, Deigh spans the gamut of human behaviour, from the best of humanity as shown with integrity, conscientiousness, and forgiveness, to the worst as evidenced by malicious wickedness and Kant’s “moral death.” Using an article on gratitude by Fred R. Berger, Deigh concludes, both in his introduction and in the book itself, that the essential ethical work must take place by pairing moral psychology with philosophy:
Berger saw the impoverishment of ethics that resulted from this trend [the displacing of ethical study by the discipline of human psychology], and he urged a new agenda that would place matters of moral psychology among the discipline’s main concerns. The essays collected in this volume confirm the fertility of this agenda. (Deigh, 1992, p. 10)
John Deigh’s title for this work is Ethics and Personality, but he has even greater aim for this collection of articles than to justify personality in the context of moral deliberation. Deigh’s ambition is to ascend the steep bank of traditional inquiry to determine a more expansive view of humans that includes the emotional components of their deliberative abilities and perceptiveness, moving towards the larger objective of approaching the marvels of the human soul itself.
The values and relationship between human reason and human desire have been contemplated in philosophical inquiry since the times of Plato and Aristotle. With post-Kantian influence, reason took centre stage in moral philosophy. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher who believed human motivation is predominantly under the control of reason. In fact, Kant’s central tenets — his two categorical imperatives — both instruct human behavioural expectations toward a functional republic life through reliance on the fundamental assumption that humans have control over their motives and passions using rational processes. But where does that leave those who wish to pay respect to human desire in its contributive value to a moral life? There are many — before and after Kant — who assert that emotions and intrinsic motivations have a fundamental role in human moral capacity (MacKinnon, 2007).
In Ethics and Personality (1992), Deigh selects his first three essays to address tensions that have come from ethical theorists who favour inclusion of an emotion-based element to moral processing over the rationalism of Kantian deontology. The first essay, by Annette Baier (1986), discusses the element of trust in relationships and, according to Deigh, reaches beyond Kantian rationality to an earlier Hume-based account of moral practices in personal relationships. For Baier, trust is the capacity to rely on another to take care of valuables. Trusting others creates vulnerability, and of particular interest to Baier is that sense of vulnerability in the asymmetrical relationships common to women’s experiences. Baier suggests that trust exists in a social arrangement when the relationship is sustained in the face of both parties demonstrating transparency in motives for social reciprocity; trust comes from endurance of the dyad where both understand and acknowledge their feelings about the political balance or imbalance within their relationship. Baier, in her discussion of trust, explicitly targets what she sees as inadequacies in the Kantian model for voluntary-based social contracts. Baier asserts that a “more complete moral philosophy would tell us how and why we should act and feel toward others in relationships of shifting and varying power asymmetry and shifting and varying intimacy” (as cited in Deigh, 1992, p. 32).
Herman (1991), in her article “Agency, Attachment, and Difference” does not agree with Baier concerning the Kantian theory’s incomplete nature. Instead, Herman believes that moral agency, when effectively situated, is always geared to consideration for the unique attributes of each social setting and the beings within that setting. Strength in moral agency is to appreciate those features of uniqueness, including features of partiality and emotional attachment. Herman does not wish, or conceive of the need, to segregate ethical doctrines for relationships of attachment from non-attachment for moral decision making. The caveat in deliberation is simply that desire and love from the agent, like any situational factors to consider, are not to be the only reasons to act. For Herman, the goal is to do good and autonomy allows for an objective weighing of alternatives, including those that benefit loved ones. Because the agent’s focus and strength is the moral duty to do good — not for the loved ones, but overall for the situation — the agent’s will protects from the biases that tend to limit decision making to a narrowed frame of care for the loved or desired one in the situation.
Adding to Herman’s descriptiveness of the objective and situated deliberative field, by which strong moral decisions are made, is Darwall’s (1977) contribution in his “Two Kinds of Respect,” Deigh’s third article in the book. Darwall discerns two kinds of respectful attitudes towards people as applied to moral decision making processes. All people, according to Darwall, deserve “recognition respect,” which is the valuing of at least one aspect of the human being considered in deliberation (the individual’s feelings, role, etc.). Respect is required for everyone in the process of ethical deliberation, namely to discipline one’s thoughts to regard the value of some aspect of each person and do only those actions that are “right” — those actions considered morally acceptable.
Darwall adds to Deigh’s larger theme of valuing affectivity in deliberation by highlighting the consideration that people have two distinct deliberative attitudes when considering ethical human behaviours. Beyond the universality of recognition respect there is also a sense of “appraisal respect,” which is a kind of positive attitude a moral agent carries for those who are perceived as paying respect to their own moral duties through deliberative efforts. Darwall asserts that there is an important distinction made, in the complex field of deliberation, where people pay respect to those believed to have merited positive appraisal - not respect arising from their emotional attachment but rather from a conscious recognition on their part for those who are thought to be doing good deeds.
Accordingly, then, in using the Herman approach to moral deliberation, people will tend to work out the contributive value of their personal sentiments, emotions, appraisal respects for others, and implications for attachment to their deliberations, before entering into the rationalization processes that are the focal considerations for Kantian-based ethics.
With the fourth article in Deigh’s book, Lynn McFall (1987) returns us to Kantian ethics itself in the keystone work of the rationalization process that neglects emotionality. McFall concludes that people cannot be impartial in this reasoning process when it comes to those they love and with those they have authentic friendships (regardless of the nature or quality of the critical thinking that comes before or after Kantian-style deliberations). What is the cost of trying to turn against one’s sense of partiality, where deep concern and care exists for loved ones? McFall says when forced to be impartial in moral decision making processes, in the absence of caring, people can lose something of themselves. Integrity cannot exist in a vacuum of reason separate and apart from emotional connection to others. Forcing such a reality onto people, whose lives are enriched by love and a sense of devotion, will mean cutting them off from their personal source of morality — one that maintains their conceptual identities and sense of self-worth. Additionally, McFall says that people may recognize this reality intuitively and thus reject the dry impartiality of Kantian deliberative thought altogether because it does not allow them value for their cares and concerns.
When individuals violate their own integrity and personal sense of rightness, it can lead to a profound sense of moral pain for them. This pain comes from their conscience. A conscience is a psychological mechanism that appears when an individual feels locked into a situation where both alternatives to a choice are necessary actions for the individual to believe moral duty has been issued, as evaluated by moral standards. James Childress (1979), in his Appeals to Conscience, speaks to the circumstances involved with compelling someone to violate personal integrity in the legal context of “conscientious objection.” Given the consequences, childress states that evoking such a strategy must be understood as a last resort: “It is prima facie a moral evil to force a person to act against his conscience, although it may often be justified and even necessary” (as cited in Deigh, 1992, p. 110). The inner penalty for persons under pressure to break their own sense of integrity, with no perceived way out other than through this violation of morals, will carry a heavy burden for those who must make this sacrifice. The sense of self-punishment that comes with violation of conscience arrives in the forms of shame and guilt, sometimes together. Childress’ conclusion in Appeals to Conscience is that given the significant detriment in compromising personal integrity, the State must carry the burden of proof necessary to force that violation through disclosure when an individual must claim conscientious objection in a court of law.
Childress’ conclusion is not good news for the rigorous rationality of Kantian ethics, provided that McFall’s (1987) assumptions about impartiality are correct, since many moral dilemmas involve loved ones. To force individuals into rigid impartiality, where there is much at stake for individuals, in terms of experiencing potentially debilitative shame and doubt, would seem, in itself, an illogical act.
Guilt and shame are the subject matters of articles six and seven in the Deigh book (1992). Deigh provides his own article on the psychological effects of shame, called “Shame and Self-esteem” (1983), and offers Herbert Morris’ “The Decline of Guilt” (1961) as a companion piece to his work. Morris’ stance with the human experience of guilt is controversial. Opposing the customary position postulated and made popular by Freud, Morris believes that guilt is not an anxiety-provoking experience that one should avoid, but instead is an inner attribute that is necessary for both personal emotional awareness and the moral wellbeing of a society. When a person hurts another, that person should feel inner distress because that psychological pain is important in initiating compensatory efforts — amendment and reparation to those who have been wronged.
Deigh, in his own piece (1983) collected in Ethics and Personality (1992), echoes Morris’ opinion on the moral value of an emotionally painful inner state. Deigh examines the purpose of shame, which is said to be experienced when there is a perceived threat to one’s sense of self-esteem. According to Deigh, shame is an inner resource that works as a self-protective mechanism. Shame can prevent an individual from carrying on with what is socially determined as embarrassing or self-demeaning behaviours; shame also initiates face-saving behaviours once there is the realization that socially problematic behaviours have occurred. For Deigh, the loss of guilt and shame, in a rationalistic deliberative process of moral decision making, means the neglect of opportunities for personal awareness and self-development, for relational healing, and for the maintenance of strong social bonds.
“Norms of Revenge,” by Jon Elster (1990), also concerns self-esteem, but speaks to the receptivity of a social environment to poor esteem. In this article, Elster assesses the social norms involved with feuds: vengeance and counter-vengeance attacks most common in pre-modern societies. Elster claims that social norms in general are not rationally derived but are the result of emotions. Where it concerns norms of revenge, the catalyst for expression is the sense that one’s honour has been challenged or violated, demanding reassertion in the form of reciprocal behaviour. Elster states that a sense of honour is an emotional urge that comes about spontaneously when individuals feel lowered self-esteem and wish to express a sense of power, worth and reputation. Because honour is a socially-dependent phenomenon, it will arise in social interaction; honour needs a social situation receptive to its expression. According to Elster, specific norms of revenge such as “brinkmanship,” “bringing the feud home,” and “boiling blood” became ways of life in the pre-modern societies that lacked formal political structures and legal regulations. Without judiciary and legal systems in a society, individual assertions of power in the form of honour-driven behaviours became commonplace and were normalized as a way to recalibrate political influence.
With these additional essays, involving the connection between moral psychology and social behaviours, Deigh’s flow of logic develops an exacting clarity: emotion has the capacity to enrich a deliberative process with moral value by paying heed to personal values and integrity. Further, by respecting inner motivational processes such as guilt and shame, emotions can offer individuals opportunities to learn and grow, to pay respect to others, and to become strong moral citizens.
Additionally, by using his specific selection of articles, Deigh articulates the point that emotions are also destructive forces if received in certain social contexts that do not adequately address the socio-psychological needs involved. Destructive, spontaneous emotional expressions can become normalized in societies that indulge in such behaviours. The transmission of selfish and violent social norms, along with a culture that justifies them, will inevitably impair the ethical development of a society. These are places where laws and policies serve to subdue social chaos but do not work to foster moral health in its citizens. In such cultures, as in instances of authoritarian regimes, the social norms evolve simply to punish and suppress the negative behaviour of its citizens. Social norms without moral functionality then tend to breed conditions where emotions become problematic to moral citizenship because feelings of moral outrage, indignation or widespread fear are not addressed. Punitive forces may diminish behaviour but not the emotion. For example, in the case of civil disobedience towards an authoritarian government, there is a political agenda that causes the negative behaviour; the strong emotions associated with such a politically-motivated behaviour will not dissolve through diminishment of the behaviours but will merely find manifestation through other means.
“Vulgarity,” by M. W. Barnes (1980), is the tenth article in Deigh’s anthology. Although not understood as being either a serious norm violation, or one that has particularly adverse effects on people, vulgarity — and the reactions to it — is a marker for the quality of norm structure in a social context within which the behaviour occurs. Vulgarity is an attitude (and has often correspondent behaviours) that expresses a casual disregard for the social customs of a given environment. A person is considered vulgar in choosing socially unacceptable behaviours when seemingly capable of the choice to fit in appropriately to the social context. The moral principle violated in vulgarity is the capacity to strive for excellence. For example, an individual who pretentiously flaunts an extravagant new home by throwing elaborate parties to showcase the obvious material success is demonstrating vulgarity. Those who are offended by the bragging in this example feel the breach of a norm; they sense the homeowner has mistaken appearances of affluence for actual superiority. Those who are particularly offended at vulgarity are people who respect the established social order of excellence because they have worked hard at trying to attain that excellence for themselves; thus, such people bristle at the efforts of others who seem to take shortcuts to acquire the social esteem legitimized through true excellence. Barnes (1980) in “Vulgarity,” studies the phenomenon of vulgarity as evidence for a social structure in a society that creates and reinforces social values:
Presumably many different types of values are involved, some perhaps reflecting the
need of the particular society to cope with its special environment, others perhaps
reflecting the general conditions of social life, still others the society’s conception
of itself, etc. … It is also likely that individuals would exist, at least in complex societies,
who fail to respect the features of the system that should be manifest to them. In that
group, but not coextensive with it, we will find the vulgar. (as cited in Deigh, 1992, p. 189)
Indicated demonstrations of vulgarity mark an individual’s social misconduct; sanctions for such vulgarity, however, mark the existence of social gatekeepers and the reality of a discernible norm-based societal structure such gatekeepers feel entitled to enforce. The less a society reacts to instances of vulgarity, the weaker the social ties.
The last part of Deigh’s book moves toward discussing societal treatment for the extremes on the spectrum of human moral behaviour and emotionality: what are the symptoms and their resultant social implications for both the virtuous and the depraved.
There are numerous types of truly destructive human psychological conditions. S. I. Benn (1985), in her article “Wickedness,” names such conditions “wickedness.” There are several kinds of wicked people: those who exercise their moral principles with self-serving intentions and those who are utterly ruthless when engaging with others are two identified by Benn. These types of wicked individuals distort the process of Kantian moral duty for their own self-serving agendas. However, there are some who have more extreme forms of wickedness with behaviours identified by Benn as “malignant wickedness.” These are individuals who break with Kantian postulates at the core of the philosophy. According to Kantian thought, one who is capable of sound deliberation of moral requirement and action will naturally follow through, out of principled thinking, to be earnestly good: reasonable persons are not capable of doing evil for evil’s sake. On the other hand, the malignantly wicked inflict pain onto others as a rational choice. They participate in behaviours that are contrary to good consciously and on purpose. Benn quotes the philosophy of Schopenhauer to articulate the inner experiences of such persons:
Very bad men bear the stamp of inward suffering…an excessive inward misery,
an eternal unrest, an incurable pain; he….seeks to mitigate his own suffering by the
sight of the suffering of others, which at the same time he recognizes as an expression
of his power.” (as cited in Deigh, 1992, p. 203)
Benn believes that, in this way, the wicked person’s desire to inflict pain — to perceive it in others as a projection of the wicked person’s own inner state — is the goal, the end. The wicked have principles, albeit evil ones, and utilize rationality to attain evil ends. Similar to the experience and outcomes of feudal violence, the desired effects of such wicked, psychopathic behaviour are either short-lived or entirely ineffective at reducing inner psychological pain (as cited in Deigh, 1992).
Kant called persons of malignant wickedness the “morally dead.” Jeffrie G. Murphy (1972), in the eleventh of Deigh’s articles in Ethics and Personality, attempts to summarize the Kantian perspective on what should be done with those who choose principled evil as their guidepost, in “Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy.”
The psychopath does not respect the rights of others or take into account any factors of obligation in social reciprocity in relationships or societal interactions. There is not a sense of obligation to give back to those who have given. A psychopath lacks Kant’s “respect for moral duty” — a conscience — that would provide a sense of guilt and shame and need for reparation of wrongdoing. The essence of Murphy’s (1972) article is the question of what should be done as a society with these fundamentally immoral people. Using DeTarde’s reasoning1 on responsibility, Murphy argues that society has no obligation to award psychopaths any human rights, given that they are categorized in their immorality as “animals” (as cited in Deigh, 1992, p. 211). However, using Kantian logic, Murphy moves to discuss the practicalities of such treatment of psychopaths, not for their sake, but for society’s. Given Kant’s two categorical imperatives, which direct those of moral duty to be deliberatively rational and humane in both individual behaviours and treatment of others, society cannot simply remove the rights of any persons. Beyond moral duty, there are considerable social implications. The notion of right behaviour must be met as social obligation through practices and roles that are contextualized in social life. How we treat others, regardless of their moral qualities, indicates societal moral health but more importantly is the foundation for socialization practices that either encourage or diminish each individual’s spontaneously derived emotionality, fostering new psychopaths or responsible moral agents.
The last two articles in Deigh’s collection concern moral requirements: what attitudes and correspondent behaviours are needed for moral forgiveness and expressions of gratitude. Norvin Richards (1988) in “Forgiveness,” offers an alternative to the standard definition of forgiveness — one that, in some instances, may offer a more discriminating ethical approach to dilemmas that involve consideration for conscious change of one’s emotional attitudes.
For Richards, forgiveness involves a strength of character that is very much in line with Kant’s moral duty. Forgiveness is not a passive acceptance of fate or suffering, as with the biblical prescriptions of forgiveness. Richards believes that forgiveness is abandoning all negative feelings that are associated with a person involved in a particular incident. Richards contends that in some cases forgiveness is morally wrong, such as when the situation involves serious affronts to one’s person or when grave harm has come. When there has been significant injury, feelings of resentment from victims, along with taking measures of the severity of offences, are both entirely appropriate effects. Even when the offender repents for wrongdoings and is conciliatory, negative affect is not considered morally incorrect. Richards introduces the idea of primary and secondary levels of moral regulation in character. When one forgives, the act of forgiveness means one must overrule one’s own emotions, and so the regulation comes from a second level — a self-regulating part of the character. One may overcome a character flaw with the use of this second level, becoming a stronger moral person, or one may deny or fail to address the need to forgive at this second level, evoking flaws at both levels.
“Gratitude” is the last work offered in the Deigh text, provided by Fred R. Berger (1975). The article speaks of the experience of gratitude in a similar vein as Richards’ treatment of forgiveness: an important experience worthy of meaningful deliberation toward an appropriate moral attitude and associated behaviours. Gratitude is specifically a conscious attitude of benevolence with the underlying desire to help and show care to another. When authentic gratitude is given and acknowledged appropriately, it strengthens bonds and promotes moral community. There are a number of ways in which displays of apparent gratitude fail in their undertaking — either from the giver’s side or from the receiver’s. For Berger, gratitude is about intention — the good will of those involved. Berger ends his article with a general statement that gratitude in interpersonal relationships, along with many similar matters, is not respected enough in moral study as the very valuable ethical experience that it is.
Deigh’s book offers a number of diverse articles of philosophical speculation, providing a complex but fruitful assessment of some important thoughts in modern philosophy associated with moral psychology. Using Kantian ethical philosophy as the central point of discussion, Deigh introduces the concern for reasons’ heightened respect in philosophical consideration in the first three chapters of the book (following the introduction). There is some placating to Kantian rationality through Herman’s treatment of the matter by supplementing the reason-focused prescription with a preliminary deliberation that pays heed to affectivity in its initial processing. However, McFall arrives to refocus the reader to the priority of the neglected emotionality in the specifics of Kantian ethics. Childress, Morris and Deigh add value to McFall’s concern by elaborating on the significance of the individual’s natural, intrinsic moral processing that is involved with conscience, and with the balancing effects of the emotions of shame and guilt.
From respecting the benefits of conscience, Deigh then takes his reader to a particular social consequence of disrespecting the natural powers of emotionality. Norms of revenge — irrational sets of social behaviours, that do not appear beneficial on any level, emerge to rule social life in the absence of moral-based social-political structures that effectively address intense and unrestrained emotionality. Deigh then offers the reader an education in vulgarity, with the hope that his reader will understand the importance of such an article as the acknowledgement that the social response to such inappropriate behaviours is telling of the social context in which they occur. It is not a great leap to then observe the subtle but effective point made by Jeffrie G. Murphy: “A problem of growing concern, particularly in the criminal law, is the existence of psychopaths — a class, which, according to some researchers, is on the increase in our highly fragmented and alienated society” (as cited in Deigh, 1992, p. 208).
Lastly, using the subjects of gratitude and forgiveness, Deigh offers the reader a conciliatory end to the trail of his emotion-based anthology of speculations. Yet, even here — in a place of affirmation regarding the human capacity for good will and resiliency, there is warning from Deigh concerning the imperative nature to affect in the deliberative process: in order to forgive morally and to be able to express gratitude in a way that builds moral community, people must take their positive feelings and affirmations and deliberate on such matters, in order to discern how to best act. There is no other way to a firm-footed ethical life but through the necessary habit of emotion-based deliberative processing.
With his careful selection of essays, each validating the importance of emotions in social life, Deigh creates a climate of affective substance in the reader, building to the more emotionally-laden subjects such as wickedness, psychopathology and the very real human challenge of forgiving others. The text is a gathering of vested interest to showcase the presence of emotionality in much of our experiential engagement: involved before, during and after the process of our explicitly reasonable periods of reflection. And, with this, Deigh demonstrates that emotions are with us throughout our experience — they marshal information, highlighting important factors of concern; they guide us in our decision making, and they help us build our interactive social existences. Deigh proves that having a subtle style in thought is not indicative of lack in influence, for his message is provocative as it stands. We are affected by experiences, even in denial of those experiences and their impact; the inability to perceive worth, through imperceptions of subtly, is not indication of actual worth.
Worth for Deigh, in this context, is the balance of rational deliberation with emotional intelligence and the corresponding grounding sense of self-possession and capacity for holistic perception. Deigh’s implicit stance, that affectivity is necessary for critical analysis, is demarcated with a number of logical lines of discourse. Yet those individual articles that make up this book offer only a compartmentalized understanding of the larger framework. In order to achieve the fuller perspective of Deigh’s approach, the reader is required to apply experiential knowledge in the appreciation for universal human emotional experiences: a sense of attachment and trust; feelings of love and care for others; pain of a heavy conscience; the weight of guilt and shame; desire for revenge, and other like emotional states. Human experience with emotions links the essays in this anthology, placing them together with the understanding that what creates a whole perception is where logic and feelings live together as complementary insight-based processes. By electing to argue his stance indirectly, with articles instead of explicit logic, Deigh may have lost some of his ability to influence, or at least to clarify, with reason. However, Deigh proves his point, in the reader’s understanding of the book itself, that the deliberative process requires emotional resources if the moral agent is to appreciate a larger picture.
Deigh’s success in proving the premise of Ethics and Personality is in how he demonstrates the value of emotionality in deliberative processes through indications of failure of the Kantian-based rationality to conceive of moral truths and to strengthen society. Deigh builds speculative momentum in the thought of a society that is deeply wounded by prescriptions of over-rationality and narrow-minded social policy. Deigh asks his reader to consider the possibility that by the existence of social norms of revenge, the developing lack of gatekeeping for incidences of social vulgarity, and in the failure to diminish psychopathology, this society has not expounded on its moral duties.
Deigh’s logic in linking respect for emotions to a healthy society is sound. To respect emotionality is to make feelings transparent in social relations. A transparent positive attitude in entering social arrangements, demonstrating the desire to connect and the capacity for trust, can foster a strengthened relationship that extends far beyond the benefits of strident commerce, and that same sense of self-possession can provide a greater chance for reparation when harm is done in negative social experiences. Furthermore, individuals who care in situations that are personally meaningful to them do not compromise moral strength when transparent with emotions. When dealing with loved ones, people maintain self-worth and authenticity when able to demonstrate partiality, empowering them to maintain their integrity and esteem. A confident moral agent is one who can better-determine the right course of action for a richer, more beneficial outcome. On a larger scale, society experiences more socially-responsible norms of compassion and consideration, and a greater emphasis on social reciprocity, when emotions are effectively acknowledged. By seeking to adequately address emotions, people will generally experience reward for authentic positive emotions, and society will not be as prone to negative social norms and self-centred behaviours.
Philosophy is the act of securing footholds of conceptual certainty in difficult terrain. The certainty of our steps has often depended on the stability of the stones beneath our feet. In walking the terrain of social life, Kantian deliberation as a method of seeking truth seems sturdy enough but, according to Deigh, neglects important components for perceiving the entire journey. Ironically, the decision to exclude the powers of intrinsic motivations and emotionality in the Kantian deliberative process may have been feeling-based, for at the time, emotions were rejected for their femininely charms and philosophers, as with all humans, can fall prey to conceptual biases and the cultural limitations of their times. What is certain is that Kant paid heed to human inner motivations and esteemed them to a degree in their ability to signal the situational requirements for moral obligations: the moral agent feels the existence of the categorical imperative — the sense of his or her moral duty. Thus, Kant did effectively render substance to emotionality, at least as a catalyst for the development of critical thought in this area.
Deigh also leaves space for his readers to feel and to carry on with further deliberations on the matters housed within his anthology. Using their own emotion-infused speculative reflections, readers can continue to weigh the importance of his work and its implications for philosophy and for our society. If feelings are any indication of value at all, than Deigh, in his robust book of essays, has succeeded in evoking an important discourse for us, demonstrating the importance of emotionality in a deliberative, meaningful life.
1 De Tarde, G. (1912). Penal Philosophy. Boston.